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I. INTRODUCTION 
Suppose there is a legislature with a set of members, M, 
each of whose preferences, R., is a weak order defined on a set of 
l 
altern<:l.tives X. Assume further that X has more than two elements 
and that M contains m ( > 1) legislators. The legislature has some 
method £or aggregating metrtber pre£erences in such a way that 
a single alternatb-:e will be chosen for any given set of preferences. 
We may· denote this aggregation procedure as a fwiction F that takes 
m-tuples of preference relations into elements of X. F may be 
thought of as a Voting procedure of some so1·t that takes the preferences 
that individuals give it as data and produces a unique social choic�. 
F (R1, ... ,Rm) EX.
Gibbard [1973] and Satterthwaite ( 1974] investigated conditions 
under which no voter has an incentive to misrepresent his true preferences 
under the procedure F. They proved that if Ix! > z, every F that is 
nondictatorial has the property that some individual voter v;rill on 
occasion have an incentive to announce a preference ordering that is 
not his own. 
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In this paper, I will impose a relatively weak preference 
restriction and a class of voting procedures with the property that 
correct revelation of p1·eferences is a Nash equilibrium. The theorem 
proved here, while quite simple mathematically, is of importance 
because the class of procedures proposed is similar to those employed 
in legislatures and because the preference restriction seems to be 
acceptable as a ·ctescriptior1 of legislator tastes. 
In order to establish this result, we shall make use of a theorem 
of Farquharson (1969]. Farquharson studied a class of voting procedures 
that worked as follows. A given set of alternatives X is divided into 
two subsets xl, x2 with the property that xl f. x and x2 f. x and 
X1 V X2 :: X. The legislature must decide which of the two alternative 
subsets it prefers according to a 116ndictatorial voting procedure that 
satisfies a positive association axiom. Then, the subset that wins on 
the first division is divided into two subsets in the same fashion and 
the legislature .must decide between these two subsets. The procedure 
contip.ues ·until a unique alternative is chosen. Such a procedure is 
called b.inary. 
Each _legislator is therefore faced with the pfoblem of ch6osing 
a strategy which tells him how to vote at each division. Farquharson 
distinguished the following types of strategies. 
Definition: A strategy is called sincere if and only if at each division 
a legislator always ¢.hooses the subset which contains his· most preferred 
alternative. In case of a tie, he picks the subset with· the highest 
second place element, etc • .
Definition: A strategy is called stralghtforward if and only if, given the 
procedure, it dominates (in a game theoretic sense) all other strategies. 
Definition: A strategy is called admissible if and only if it is undominated. 
One- can se·e that if all legislators have strong preference orders 
(xR.y and yR.x ==:::;>- x = y) then there is only one sincere voting strategy. 
l l 
Further, if there is a straightforward strategy, it is unique. 
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Farquharson introduced the notion of a sophisticated voting 
strategy in the following manner. ·The set of admissible strategies 
is called the set of primarily admissible strategies. Under the 
assumption that no one else will play an inadmissible strategy, each 
legislator may apply the definition of adtnissibility again and obtain 
the set of secondarily adtnissible strategies. The set of k-arily 
admissible strategies :i.s obtained by finding the set of admissible 
strategies under the assumption that the others will each employ 
(k - 1)-arily admissible strategies. 
Definition: A strategy is sophisticated if and only if it is k-arily 
admissible for all k, 
Farquharson proved that if everyone adopts a sophisticated strategy 
under a binary procedure, and if preferences are strong, then there 
is a determinate outcome in the sense that if any subset of voters switch 
to alternative sophisticated strategies the outcome_ is unchanged (note 
that sophisticated strategies are� generally unique). Further, if 
everyone chooses a sophisticated strategy, the legislatu:re is at a Nash 
equilibrium. We shall demonstrate that for a class of procedure and 
a particular preference restriction, the unique sophisticated voting 
strategy for each legislator is his sincere voting strategy. Thus, 
a fortiori sincere voting in this case is an equilibrium configuration. 
JI. THE MODEL 
We shall assume that, as in actual legislative bodies, the set 
of alternatives X is constructed through the passage or failure of a 
set of n bills. We may therefore write X as a Cartesian product as 
follows: X = [ 0, 11 n where 0 denotes the failure of a bill and I, its 
passage. Elements of X are simply ordered n-tuples that tell which 
bills passed and which did not. The class of procedures under 
examination here is described informally as follows. The legislature 
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takes up the bills in a given order and decides on pas sage or failure 
one bill at a time. An example will illustrate the sort of restriction 
that is being described. Suppose there are two bills and, therefore, 
four alternatives constructed as follows: 
A 
B 
c 
D 
pp 
PF 
FP 
FF 
Consider the following three agendas: 
Agenda one 
B c D A 
Agenda three 
A c B 
Agenda two 
D 
D 
I' 
B 
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Agendas one and three satisfy the above definition while agenda two 
does not. Agendas that satisfy this definition are called bill-by-bill 
(BBB), 
Each of the voters is assumed to have a strong preference 
order on X that satisfies the following condition. 
Definition: A preference ordering R on X = [O, I1m is separable if 
and only if for any subset of bills Q and x, y, X, y E X such that 
x. = y. and X. = Y. 'I. E Q and
1 l l 1 l 
X
i 
= x
i and Yi 
= y i vi � a then
X .. �y if and only if x Ry. 
That is, a legislator1s preference for the passage or failure of a 
particular bill does not depend on the disposition of the other bills. 
'I'he following exa'mple shows that if a legislator has separable 
preferences, and if the agenda is BBB, then he does not necessarily 
have a straightforward strategy. 
Example 1: Assume there are two issues and four alternatives labeled as 
·c above and that agenda three is in use. Assume the legislator has
the following preferences: A 
B 
c 
D 
Then depending on how the other legisiators vote, A may beat C or 
C may beat A and B may or may not beat D. If the first legislator 
believes that A will beat C then he votes for {A, C} on the first division. 
If he thinks that B beats D and C beats A, then he should vote for {B, D} 
on the first rlivision. Evidently he does not have a straightforward 
strategy. 
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Nevertheless, we may demonstrate the following theorem. 
Theorem: If all legislators have strong separable preferences, and 
if the agenda is bill-by-bill, then the unique sophisticated voting 
strategy for each legislator is to vote sincerely. 
Proof: Consider an arbitrary bill-by-bill agenda. At the final vote, 
once all but one of the bills has been decided, each legislator will vote 
sincerely in every primarily admissible strategy. Thus, each will 
vote for pas sage or against passage of this bill no matter what happened 
on the other bills. Thus, the disposition of the final bill is certain to 
each legislator under the assumption that everyone plays a primarily 
admissible strategy and has separable preferences. 
On the next to last vote, the disp'osition of the first n-2 bills 
is known, and if everyone plays primarily admissible, strategies so is 
the disposition of the last bill. Thus, as before, each legislator will 
vote sincere! y on this bill in all secondarily admissible strategies. 
Since his preferences are separable, he will either vote for passage 
regardless of the disposition of the other bills or for failure. 
Repeating this argument, it is seen that the only ultimately 
admissible strategy is the sincere voting strategy. 
Q. E. D. 
Note that this result depends on the assumption that everyone 
has separable preferences. If not, the situation in example one could 
arise: C might beat A while B beats D at the last vote. In this situation, 
a sophisticated legislator with separable preferences would vote 
insincerely on the first bill. 
Further 1 this theorem depends crucially on the assumption 
that the agenda is bill-bv-bill. Consider the following example using 
agenda two given above. 
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Example 2: Assume that three legislators have the following preferences 
and that the passage of bills is decided by simple majority rule: 
1 2 3 
A D D 
B B B 
c c c 
D A A 
On the second division, D beats A and B beats C so that if Mr. 1 is 
sophisticated he will vote insincerely on the first division. 
III. DISCUSSION
The simple little theorem in this paper demonstrates that, 
in a certain sense, we have been able to find a class of voting 
procedures for deciding among sets of more than three elements that 
seem to be 11unmanipulableu and nondictatorial. How does this square 
with the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem? Of course, our notion of 
manipulability is somewhat different than theirs. In the Gibbard­
Satterthwaite sense, binary bill-by-bill procedures are rr�anipulable 
since one can imagine a set of announced preferences in all but one of 
the legislators that leaves the last legislator an incentive to misreveal 
his preferences. Exactly such a case was given in exan1ple two. For 
the Gibbard-Satterthwaite definition of nonm.anipulability to be satisfied, 
a procedure would have to present each member with a straightforward 
strategy no matter what his preferences are, We have implicitly 
offered a weaker definition. A procedure is unmanipulable with respect 
to a preference restriction if and only if for all admissible preferences 
the strategy m-tuple in which all members vote sincerely is a Nash 
equilibrium. 
The importance of the preference restriction in the above 
discussion should be emphasized, Using the Gibbard-Satterthwaite 
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theorem, we can easily show that if legislators can hold any m-tuple 
of weak orders then the sincere-voting strategy m-tuple cannot be an 
equilibrium for all preference configurations. Assume. the contrary. 
Using the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem, if the procedure is 
nondictatorial there is an (m-1)-tuple of strategy choices by all but 
one of the voters that gives the last voter" an incentive to misreveal 
his preferences. Simply choose a preference configuration so that 
the (m-1)-tuple consists of sincere revelation by the other voters. 
Thus, some sort of restri�tion on preferences is needed to guarantee 
that sincere voting is an equilibrium stra tegy. It is pleasing that the 
required restriction seems relatively weak as a descriptive statement 
about preferences. 
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